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Abstract
Low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses of H5 and H7 subtypes have the potential to mutate into highly pathogenic
strains (HPAI), which can threaten human health and cause huge economic losses. The current knowledge on the
mechanisms of mutation from LPAI to HPAI is insufficient for predicting which H5 or H7 strains will mutate into an HPAI
strain, and since the molecular changes necessary for the change in virulence seemingly occur at random, the probability of
mutation depends on the number of virus replicates, which is associated with the number of birds that acquire infection.
We estimated the transmission dynamics of LPAI viruses in turkeys using serosurveillance data from past epidemics in Italy.
We fitted the proportions of birds infected in 36 flocks into a hierarchical model to estimate the basic reproduction number
(R0) and possible variations in R0 among flocks caused by differences among farms. We also estimated the distributions of
the latent and infectious periods, using experimental infection data with outbreak strains. These were then combined with
the R0 to simulate LPAI outbreaks and characterise the resulting dynamics. The estimated mean within-flock R0 in the
population of infected flocks was 5.5, indicating that an infectious bird would infect an average of more than five
susceptible birds. The results also indicate that the presence of seropositive birds does not necessarily mean that the virus
has already been cleared and the flock is no longer infective, so that seropositive flocks may still constitute a risk of infection
for other flocks. In light of these results, the enforcement of appropriate restrictions, the culling of seropositive flocks, or
pre-emptive slaughtering may be useful. The model and parameter estimates presented in this paper provide the first
complete picture of LPAI dynamics in turkey flocks and could be used for designing a suitable surveillance program.
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Introduction
Infection with low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI) viruses is
widespread and in many countries has led to outbreaks in domestic
birds [1]. Although LPAI strains do not pose a serious concern for
animal health, LPAI subtypes H5 and H7 may mutate into highly
pathogenic strains (HPAI) [2], outbreaks of which can threaten
human health [3], in addition to causing huge economic losses due
to high bird-mortality rates and to the cost of control measures [4].
Although influenza viruses have been extensively studied, the
current knowledge on the mechanisms of mutation from LPAI to
HPAI is insufficient for predicting which H5 or H7 strains will
mutate into an HPAI strain. Moreover, given that the molecular
changes necessary for the change in virulence seem to occur at
random [5], the probability that an LPAI strain will mutate into an
HPAI strain depends on the extent of viral replication, which in
turn is associated with the number of birds that acquire infection.
Hence knowledge of the disease dynamics of LPAI viruses is
important for better understanding their reversion to virulence.
This knowledge can also contribute to optimizing surveillance
systems and improving the effectiveness of control measures for
reducing transmission and thus the number of virus replicates,
reducing the probability of mutation into HPAI viruses.
Studies conducted on the disease dynamics of LPAI viruses
under experimental conditions have provided rough estimates of
the parameters of bird-to-bird transmission for a H5N2 LPAI [6]
and a H7N1 LPAI [7] virus strains. For instance, the basic
reproduction number (R0), which is defined as the mean number
of secondary cases per primary case in a susceptible population [8]
and is a key epidemiological parameter, was estimated to be
between 0.6 and 4.0. However, in experimental conditions it is
impossible to assess the variability in transmission that occurs
among flocks in field conditions. Using outbreak data, the
transmission dynamics of HPAI strains have been studied by
applying compartmental models and using mortality data to
extrapolate the moment of virus introduction [9,10]. However, for
LPAI epidemics, such data cannot be used because infections
result in only mild symptoms and low mortality rates.
In the period 2000–2005, Italy experienced four epidemics of
LPAI, all of which occurred in the north and most of which
involved meat turkeys. In the present study, we used serosurveil-
lance data from these epidemics [11] to estimate the R0 of LPAI in
turkeys; this is the first time that field data have been used to
evaluate the transmission dynamics of LPAI. We fitted the
proportions of birds ultimately infected in 36 flocks into a
hierarchical model to estimate R0 and the possible variation in
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more complete picture of LPAI transmission, we used experimen-
tal infection data with outbreak strains to estimate the distributions
of the latent and infectious periods. These were then combined
with the R0 to simulate LPAI outbreaks, characterise the resulting
dynamics, and discuss the implications for surveillance.
Results
Basic reproduction number (R0)
Using data from the 2000–2005 LPAI outbreaks in northern
Italy, we estimated the R0 based on the seroprevalence in selected
flocks after the outbreaks had come to an end (referred to as the
‘‘final size’’). In other words, we considered only those flocks that
tested negative to antigen detection 65 days from the earliest
positive serological finding in the flock. The selected farms
consisted of those with unvaccinated meat-turkey flocks housed
in a single shed. This resulted in 36 selected flocks (Table 1): 27
were infected by H7N3 and 9 by H7N1 LPAI strains. The mean
seroprevalence (i.e., final size) in the selected flocks was 89.3%
(Exact Fisher’s 95% confidence interval: 85.7–92.2), which was
significantly higher than the seroprevalence in the flocks that were
positive for antigen detection (i.e., 61.7%; 95%CI: 50.3–72.3, data
not shown), confirming the validity of this inclusion criterion (i.e.,
negative for antigen detection).
The final size data were fitted into a Bayesian hierarchical
model (Figure 1) to estimate the distribution of R0 among flocks,
resulting in a mean value of 5.5 (95% posterior credible interval:
3.4–18.3) and a variance of 11.3 (95%PCI: 1.7–298). The
sensitivity of the diagnostic test (i.e., haemoagglutination inhibi-
tion) was estimated in the same model and was equal to 0.977
(95%PCI: 0.953–0.992) (Table 2), which was insensitive to the
choice of prior distribution (0.975 with uninformative prior).
Estimation of latent and infectious periods
Given that field data were not available for estimating the
duration of the latent and infectious periods, we used previous data
from experimental infections with outbreak strains. The data were
available for 18 unvaccinated commercial turkeys challenged with
two different LPAI strains (H5N2 and H7N3, 9 birds per strain)
and swabbed at days 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15 and 20 post inoculation.
Infectivity was tested by means of both PCR and virus isolation
assays. The test results are given in Table 3. Because sensitivity was
higher for PCR, compared to virus isolation assays, we used the
PCR results for our default analysis. However, given that positive
virus isolation may better reflect infectivity, we repeated the
analysis with the virus isolation results to assess the sensitivity of
this choice for the outbreak simulations described below.
The estimates of latent and infectious periods were calculated
using a Bayesian model, and the results varied according to the
definition of ‘‘infected animal’’. When the definition was based on
the quantity of viral genome in faeces (identified by PCR), the
mean latent period was 2.9 days (95%PCI: 2.4–3.4), and the mean
infectious period was 8.2 days (95%PCI: 6.5–10.6). When the
definition was based on the isolation from faeces of a live virus
capable of replication (detected by virus isolation), the mean latent
period was 8.7 days (95%PCI: 3.9–33.8) and the mean infectious
period was 2.3 days (95%PCI: 1.3–3.5) (Table 4).
Outbreak simulations
To characterize the dynamics of LPAI outbreaks, we simulated
1,000 outbreaks in flocks of 10,000 turkeys each, with a SEIR
stochastic model using the posterior median transmission param-
eters (Tables 2, 4, 5), with the estimates of latent and infectious
periods derived from the PCR results (dataset A).
The descriptive statistics of the simulated outbreaks using the
baseline model (model 2) are shown in Table 6. The quoted
intervals are the 2.5
th and 97.5
th percentiles. The duration of
outbreaks (i.e., from the first to the last infected turkey) ranged
from 56 to 337 days (i.e., 2 to 11 months), although 90% of the
infections were observed in a period of 10–150 days. The epidemic
peak (i.e., the day that the peak number of infective birds was
reached) occurred at a median of 45 days after the first case, which
is only 7 days after a serological sample of 10 turkeys would be
detected with 50% probability (median Tdet50% is 38 days). At the
peak, a median of about 50% of the turkeys were infected, though
this percentage greatly varied among farms (3% – 74%). At that
Table 1. Outbreak data included in the analyses.
outbreak ID virus strain sampled birds positive findings
1 H7N3 10 10
2 H7N3 10 10
3 H7N3 10 5
4 H7N3 10 10
5 H7N3 10 9
6 H7N3 10 10
7 H7N3 10 9
8 H7N3 10 9
9 H7N3 10 10
10 H7N3 10 9
11 H7N1 10 10
12 H7N3 10 10
13 H7N3 10 9
14 H7N3 10 10
15 H7N3 8 8
16 H7N3 10 10
17 H7N3 10 10
18 H7N1 20 20
19 H7N1 10 8
20 H7N1 10 9
21 H7N1 10 10
22 H7N3 10 10
23 H7N1 15 12
24 H7N3 10 10
25 H7N1 10 1
26 H7N3 10 10
27 H7N1 10 10
28 H7N1 10 8
29 H7N3 10 10
30 H7N3 10 9
31 H7N3 10 7
32 H7N3 10 10
33 H7N3 10 10
34 H7N3 10 10
35 H7N3 10 2
36 H7N3 10 9
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.t001
Low Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Dynamics
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 2 October 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 10 | e26935time, 15.8% – 28.3% of the turkeys were already seropositive,
indicating a period of overlap where both antigen and serological
tests were able to detect infection. As expected, the seroprevalence
at the end of the outbreak (Rfinal,) (i.e., the final size) was high, even
higher than 99.4% in half of the cases.
Sensitivity analysis
To investigate the possible sources of variation in the outbreaks’
descriptive statistics, we compared the above-mentioned results
(obtained with the baseline model) with simulations derived from
models with different levels of uncertainty (Table 5). In particular,
model 1 was used to investigate only stochastic effects, model 2
(i.e., the baseline model) to investigate stochastic effects and
variation in R0 among flocks, and model 3 to investigate stochastic
effects, variation in R0 among flocks, and uncertainty about the
parameters that defined the distribution of the R0, latent and
infectious periods. The results are provided in Table 7. The
estimated median values obtained with model 1 were very similar
to those obtained with the baseline model, though with a marked
narrowing of the 95% credible intervals. This is clearly visible for
the peak number of infective birds (median Ipeak: 52.4% in model 1
versus 49.8% in model 2), for which the precision of the estimation
in model 1 reached a very narrow interval (51.3%–53.4%). This
implies that most variation in the field is due to intrinsic differences
among flocks and not to stochastic effects. Obviously, model 3
added more uncertainty to the estimates, resulting in broader
credible intervals; however the median results of model 3 were
similar to those obtained with model 2 (Tables 6 and 7). The
differences between models 2 and 3 were relatively small,
indicating that more precise parameter estimates would improve
the predicted dynamics of LPAI outbreaks only to a limited extent.
This can also be seen in Figure 2, in which an example of the
impact of the three models on the time of the epidemic peak is
illustrated. Whereas the median estimates were quite similar, the
higher precision of model 1 led to a sharper distribution compared
to the distributions resulting from models 2 and 3, which
encompassed more uncertainty.
To investigate the effect of the definition of ‘‘infectious bird’’ on
the disease dynamics, we performed additional simulations using
the posterior estimates derived from virus isolation results (i.e.,
dataset B) (Table 4). Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics of the
1,000 simulated outbreaks using model 2 and dataset B. The final
size of the epidemic was the same (99.5%), yet the duration of the
epidemic was longer (135 days), the epidemic peak occurred
slightly earlier (41 days after infection), and the proportion of
infectious birds at the epidemic peak was lower (11.3%) The
different disease dynamics associated with different definitions of
‘‘infective birds’’ is shown in Figure 3. The different assumptions of
infectivity (i.e., based upon different diagnostic assays) led to
different peak prevalences; however, the timing of the peak
prevalences was very close (41 versus 45 days after infection).
Discussion
In this study, we provide quantitative information on key
epidemiological parameters of LPAI dynamics in turkeys, which is
the first time that this has been done using outbreak data. We first
estimated the basic reproduction number of LPAI infections using
the final size equation. To do so, some conditions had to be met.
First, the data had to refer to a single population with
homogeneous mixing. Because data from farms with multiple
sheds were not stratified by shed, only the flocks consisting of a
single shed were included in the analyses. Second, the seroprev-
alence in the samples needed to be representative of the entire
flock, so that the seroprevalence in each sample could be
considered to have a binomial distribution depending on the final
size and the sample size. In accordance with the surveillance plan,
sampled animals were randomly selected within each flock. Third,
the outbreaks in the flocks had to have ended (i.e., no virus should
have still been circulating). For this reason we included only flocks
with negative virus tests 65 days from the day of serological
positivity. The validity of this inclusion criterion was indicated by
the lower seroprevalence in virus-positive flocks, although absolute
certainty about the final size status of the flocks can never be
obtained. If a virus had still been circulating in some flocks, the R0
would have been underestimated.
Based on these assumptions, the estimated mean within-flock R0
in the population of infected flocks was 5.5, meaning that on
average an infectious bird would infect more than five susceptible
animals. In an experimental study of van der Goot et al. (2003) [6],
estimates of R0 for LPAI H5N2 in chickens were much lower,
ranging from 0.6 to 1.2. On the other hand, Gonzales et al. (2011)
[7] recently estimated R0 for LPAI H7N1 in experimentally
infected chickens to be about 4.0, demonstrating a high variability
in virus transmission among different strains. Another possible
Figure 1. Hierarchical model linking serosurveillance data with
R0 in the population of infected flocks, through the final size
equation. m, mean R0 in the population of infected flocks; s
2, variance
of R0 in the population of infected flocks; R0i, basic reproductive
number of each infected flock i; p, final size of the epidemic; x,
proportion of positive samples; n, total number of samples.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.g001
Table 2. Estimation of R0.
median 95% posterior credibility interval
r, rate 2.73 [0.9839 – 7.47]
k, shape 0.4909 [0.06023 – 2.07]
m, mean R0 5.535 [3.357 –18.33]
s
2, variance of R0 11.29 [1.684 – 298.8]
Se, test sensitivity 0.9768 [0.9532 – 0.9924]
Median and 95% credibility intervals of the posterior densities of shape and rate
(i.e., the parameters defining the gamma distribution of R0 in the population of
infected flocks), mean and variance of R0 and test sensitivity.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.t002
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estimates reported in literature could be due to differences in
susceptibility between chickens and turkeys, which has been
reported in comparative experimental studies [12,13] that show
that turkeys are highly susceptible to LPAI infections and that
chickens are less susceptible. Lastly, the difference could also be
due to differences between experimental and field conditions, as
reported by Bos et al. (2010) [14] for HPAI; in particular, whereas
experiments take place under controlled settings, in field
conditions other factors can enhance transmission, such as
concurrent infections, climatic and environmental factors, and
factors related to management.
In several studies on within-flock transmission of HPAI based on
outbreak data [9,10,14], only a single R0 was estimated, based on
the assumption that there is only one R0 that is common to all
flocks. However, in the field a number of factors can result in
differences among flocks. First of all, there are differences between
LPAI virus strains [6,7], such as the amount of virus excreted by
infected birds and the minimum infectious dose [15]. Further-
more, we should also consider the differences in the characteristics
of the farms and the age of the birds when the outbreak occurs.
For example, the density of birds, which is mainly related to the
birds’ size and thus their age, can affect the contact rate among
animals. Moreover, the time at which the virus enters a flock may
instead influence the infectivity and/or susceptibility of the birds,
which is related to their age, immunological competence and
eventual stress due to intensive production cycles. Our approach
took into account this variability by modelling R0 as a probability
distribution and thus allowing the transmission dynamics to vary
from flock to flock. Furthermore, in our model, the sensitivity of
the test was estimated together with R0, and the median sensitivity
was 97.6%, which is fairly close to the sensitivity suggested by
laboratory experience (98%). Uncertainty about test performance
allowed us to better account for the fact that data came from a
serosurveillance program, whose results depend on the true
infectious status of the flock, the sampling scheme and the
accuracy of the diagnostic assays.
To investigate the within-flock dynamics of LPAI viruses, we
needed to know the temporal window of infectivity, defined by the
mean lengths of the latent and infectious periods. Because this
information was unavailable from field data, we based our
estimates on earlier experimental infections with the outbreak
strains. The infection status of single birds was tested by means of
both PCR and virus isolation assays. If PCR results reflect
Table 3. Test results of swabbed turkeys at different days post infection.
results of PCR assay (dataset A) results of virus isolation (dataset B)
days p.i.* 3 5 7 10 12 15 20 days p.i. 3571 0 1 2 1 5 2 0
ID of challenged
birds
k1 +++––––k 1 + ––– – – –
k2 – +++ –––k 2 – – + ––––
k3 – ++– – – – k 3 –––– – – –
k4 – +++ –––k 4 – – + ––––
k5 – ++– – – – k 5 –––– – – –
k6 +++– – – – k 6 –––– – – –
k7 – ++––––k 7 – – + ––––
k8 – ++––––k 8 – + – ––––
k9 – +++ – + –k 9 – ++––––
k10 – +++ – + – k 1 0 –––– – – –
k11 ++++ + – – k 1 1 –––– – – –
k12 ++++ – – – k 1 2 –––– – – –
k13 ++++ + + – k 1 3 –––– ++–
k14 ++++ – + – k 1 4 –––– – + –
k15 + – – ––––k 1 5 + ––– – – –
k16 ++++ + + – k16 + ––– – + –
k17 ++++ – – – k 1 7 –––– – – –
k18 ++++ + – – k 1 8 –––– + ––
Birds k1 to k9 were challenged with H5N2 LPAI virus and birds k10 to k18 with H7N3 LPAI virus.
*Days p.i. = days post inoculation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.t003
Table 4. Estimates of the latent (LP) and infectious (IP)
periods.
dataset A dataset B
mean latent period (days) 2.932 [2.407; 3.388] 8.650 [3.847; 33.780]
mean infectious period
(days)
8.161 [6.454; 10.580] 2.323 [1.303; 3.530]
kL 17.480 [3.011; 128.20] 0.878 [0.240; 3.458]
rL 5.954 [1.096; 43.110] 0.102 [0.011; 0.533]
kI 4.640 [2.036; 9.634] 3.803 [0.672; 53.210]
rI 0.568 [0.233; 1.228] 1.723 [0.332; 18.100
Median and 95% credibility intervals of the posterior densities of kL, rL, kI and rI
(i.e., the parameters defining the gamma distribution of LP and IP), and the
mean latent and infectious periods.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.t004
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longer than that reported for chickens: 4.5 to 7.7 days for LPAI
[6,7] and 1.3–2.5 days for HPAI [16]. This may be related to the
higher R0 in turkeys and to the virus strain.
In our experimental data, a positive PCR result indicated the
presence of viral genome in faeces, which may not be sufficient for
replication and the infection of new hosts, possibly resulting in an
overestimate of the length of the infectious period. For this reason,
we also estimated the infectious period using the results of virus
isolation assay, to assess the effect on the predicted outbreak
dynamics. In fact, a positive virus isolation implies that the virus
can replicate and may thus better reflect infectivity. The difference
between the two tests can be seen in Table 3: for example, bird
k13 tested positive to PCR from day 3 to day 15 (dataset A) but
showed a detectable amount of virus only starting from day 12
(dataset B). Thus, based on virus isolation, the latent period would
be longer and the infectious period shorter. However, the
difference in terms of mean generation time was small: 7.9 and
10.1 days for PCR and virus isolation results, respectively. The
comparison of the prevalence between the two datasets is unfair
because it is based on different diagnostic tests and assumptions
regarding infectivity. The important difference lies in the timing of
the peak prevalence and the increase in seroprevalence, which
were rather similar when comparing PCR and virus isolation data
(Figure 3), indicating that the results are not very sensitive to the
choice of diagnostic assay.
The comparison of the three simulation models showed that the
variation in R0 among flocks plays an important role in the
variation among outbreaks (Tables 6 and 7). In Figure 2, it appears
that model 1, which only accounts for differences due to the
stochastic process, resulted in only a limited variability in the
timing of the epidemic peak (median: 43 days, 95%PCI: 39–51).
Adding uncertainty related to possible variation of R0 among
flocks (model 2) resulted in a similar median estimate (45 days), yet
it remarkably increased the variation (95%PCI: 28–164), as
demonstrated by the much flatter density distribution of the
parameter. The inclusion of further uncertainty about the
parameter estimates (model 3) led to an additional widening of
the interval (95%PCI: 17–235), but the difference was limited
extent when compared to model 2. (Figure 2, solid versus dotted
line). We could thus argue that our estimates of latency, infectivity
and the mean and variance of R0 in the population of infected
flocks are sufficiently precise, though we cannot overlook the
variation in R0 among flocks, which seems to play the most
important role in the variation among infected premises.
The simulations showed that the finding of seropositive birds
does not necessarily mean that the flock is no longer infective:
Table 6 shows that at the epidemic peak about 50% of the turkeys
were infected, yet that 16% to 28% of the turkeys were already
seropositive, indicating a period of overlap where both antigen and
antibodies are detectable (Figure 3, grey lines). This implies that
seropositive flocks may still pose a risk for other flocks; thus the
enforcement of appropriate restrictions, the culling of seropositive
flocks or pre-emptive slaughtering may be useful in preventing
farm-to-farm transmission. On the other hand, sero-sampling for
early disease detection may be difficult, because the time by which
a serological sample of 10 turkeys would result in detection with
50% probability (Tdet50%) is only 7 days before peak infectivity
(Tpeak).
The model and parameter estimates presented in this paper
provide the first complete picture of LPAI dynamics in turkey
flocks and could as such be used for the design and optimization of
a suitable surveillance program.
Materials and Methods
The within-flock disease dynamics of LPAI were investigated
using field data from outbreaks and data from experimental
infections and combining these data in a stochastic simulation
model. The investigation was conducted in three steps:
1. Estimation of within-flock R0 for LPAI infections using field
data and a Bayesian hierarchical model based on the final size
equation, provided below;
Table 5. Input parameters and assumptions for the three simulation models.
model 1 model 2* model 3
input parameters m, kL, rL, kI, rI k, r, kL, rL, kI, rI k[i], r[i], kL[i], rL[i], kI[i], rI[i]
basic reproduction number R0[i] = mR 0[i] , Gamma(k, r) R0[i] , Gamma(k[i], r[i])
latent period LP[i] , Gamma(kL, rL) LP[i] , Gamma(kL, rL) LP[i] , Gamma(kL[i], rL[i])
infectious period IP[i] , Gamma(kI, rI) IP[i] , Gamma(kI, rI) IP[i] , Gamma(kI[i], rI[i])
*baseline model.
m, mean R0; kL and rL, parameters describing the gamma distribution of the latent period; kI and rI, parameters describing the gamma distribution of the infectious
period; k, shape parameter of the gamma distribution of R0; r, rate parameter of the gamma distribution of R0; i = 1 to 1,000 (i.e., number of simulated outbreaks).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.t005
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for 1,000 simulated outbreaks
using the baseline model (model 2) and reference dataset
(dataset A) (i.e., PCR results).
parameter mean median 2.5
th percentile 97.9
th percentile
Duration (days) 106 83 56 337
Tpeak (days) 57 45 28 164
D90% (days) 32 20 10 150
Ipeak (%) 46.4 49.8 3.4 74.1
Rpeak (%) 28.8 29.6 15.8 28.3
Rfinal (%) 93.5 99.4 41.9 100
Tdet50% (days) 47 38 25 130
Model 2 assumed that all 1,000 simulated outbreaks had the same value of
mean latent and infections periods (estimated using the results of PCR assay),
whereas values of R0 were all sampled from the same gamma distribution with
parameters k and r at the median value of the posterior distributions.
Parameters’ meaning: Duration, duration of the epidemic in days; Tpeak, time of
the epidemic peak (days after infection); D90%, time interval (days) during which
the mid-90% of the cases occur (90% incidence interval); Ipeak, peak number of
infective birds; Rpeak, seroprevalence at the epidemic peak; Rfinal,
seroprevalence at the end of the outbreak; Tdet50, time by which a serological
sample of 10 turkeys would result in detection with 50% probability (days).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.t006
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LPAI in turkeys, using pre-existing data from experimental
infections; and
3. Simulation of outbreaks using the estimates in points 1 and 2
and characterisation of LPAI outbreaks and their uncertainty
(sensitivity analysis).
Estimation of the basic reproduction number (R0)
Data source. The field data were provided by the intensive
surveillance system which was in place during the LPAI epidemics in
2000–2001, 2002–2003, 2004 and 2005 [17]. During and around the
time of the epidemics, a total of 6,102 poultry farms were routinely
visited; 495 infected premises (i.e., outbreaks) were identified; 429
(87%) of these premises reared meat turkeys. Of the 429 outbreaks,
we included only those that had occurred among unvaccinated flocks
(n=204). Although it would have been interesting to have
investigated the disease dynamics in vaccinated birds, this was not
possible because in the vaccinated flocks only unvaccinated sentinels
weresampled.Tofulfiltheassumptionofhomogeneousmixingofthe
animals required for the analysis, we only included those farms on
which the birds were housed in a single shed (n=64).
Inclusion criteria. At the 64 farms, multiple samplings had
been carried out. In each flock, a median of 10 (range: 8–20) birds
per sampling were considered. We considered the earliest
sampling that revealed a positive serological finding and
determined whether an antigen detection assay had been
performed 65 days from this finding; antigen detection had
been performed on mixed samples (pools) of five birds. If the flock
was negative, then the outbreak was assumed to be over, and the
seroprevalence in the sample was considered to represent the
proportion of the population that had been infected by the end of
the outbreak (defined as the ‘‘final size’’). This resulted in the
identification of 36 outbreaks (Table 1 and Table S1).
Model building. The final size of an epidemic (p, the
proportion of a population that had been infected by the end of
an outbreak) and the basic reproduction number (R0) are related
through the final size equation:
p~1{e(-pR0) ð1Þ
which is considered to be valid under very general circumstances
[18]. Serosurveillance data were fitted to a hierarchical model
(Figure 1), assuming that R0 in the population of infected flocks
followed a gamma probability distribution, with mean m and
variance s
2. Each R0i of flock i corresponds to a final size pi,
calculated numerically from Eq. 1. The observed number of
positive samples xi in each flock was then considered to be a
sample from a binomial distribution with n = ni (sample size) and
p = pi (final size)*test sensitivity (which represents the apparent
prevalence in each flock i). The gamma distribution of R0 was
defined by the parameters shape (k.0) and rate (r.0), which are
related to the mean (m) and variance (s
2)o fR0 as:
m~ k
r and s2~ k
r2
Furthermore, the use of an imperfect diagnostic test was
assumed in the detection of seroprevalence, with sensitivity
modelled as a Beta distribution. This model is the result of a
careful preliminary investigation in which several alternatives have
been compared. The initial assumption of a single R0 value
common to all the infected flocks did not fit our field data and we
thus modelled R0 as a probability density distribution. Different
hypothesis on R0 distribution and test sensitivity were then
Table 7. Sensitivity analysis: descriptive statistics for 1,000 simulated outbreaks under different model assumptions and datasets.
Model 1 – dataset A Model 3 – dataset A Model 2 – dataset B
Parameter median
2.5
th
percentile
97.5
th
percentile median
2.5
th
percentile
97.5
th
percentile median
2.5
th
percentile
97.5
th
percentile
Duration (days) 79 72 90 86 42 400 135 100 400
Tpeak (days) 43 39 51 47 17 235 41 18 175
Ipeak (%) 52.4 51.3 53.4 46.7 1.4 87.2 11.3 1.2 16.2
Rfinal (%) 99.6 99.5 99.7 99.3 38.4 100 99.5 49.7 100
Model 1 assumed that all 1,000 simulated outbreaks had the same R0, kL, rL, kI and rI, all medians from the posterior distributions. Model 2 assumed all simulations
with the same kL, rL, kI and rI, but with different R0.I nmodel 3 all simulations had different kL, rL, kI, rI,a n dR0. Dataset A includes the results of PCR assay, whereas
dataset B includes the results of virus isolation. Duration, duration of the epidemic in days; Tpeak, time of the epidemic peak (days after infection); Ipeak, peak number
of infective birds; Rfinal, seroprevalence at the end of the outbreak.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.t007
Figure 2. Sensitivity analysis: estimates of time of the epidemic
peak (Tpeak) resulting from 1,000 outbreak simulations using
the three different models and the reference dataset (i.e., PCR
data).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.g002
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criterion (DIC) [19]. The currently presented model is the one
which resulted in the best fit of the field data.
The model was implemented in WinBUGS software version
1.4.3; posterior distributions were obtained using the default
internal Gibbs sampler [20]. Uninformative prior distributions
were used for the parameters k and r [i.e., Gamma(0.01,0.01)].
Informative prior information, based on laboratory experience
(but no solid data), was used for the distribution of test sensitivity.
Using the R function beta.prior (available at http://skoval.bol.
ucla.edu/beta.prior.R), we derived the parameters of the Beta
distribution that corresponded to a most likely sensitivity of 0.98
and to a 95% certainty that the sensitivity would be greater than
0.95 [i.e. Beta(151.77,4.08)]. Posterior inferences were based on
30,000 iterations with a sampling lag of 10, after a burn-in of
15,000 iterations was discarded. Convergence was assessed by
running multiple chains from dispersed starting values and using
the Gelman-Rubin statistic.
Estimation of latent and infectious periods
Data source. The data used for this analysis were taken from
a vaccine trial performed in 2004 at the Italian National Reference
Laboratory for Avian Influenza (unpublished data). Eighteen
unvaccinated commercial turkeys (i.e., the controls of the trial)
were challenged with two LPAI strains at 12 weeks of age via the
intranasal route. Nine birds were challenged with H5N2 LPAI
virus A/TK/IT/80 and 9 birds with H7N3 LPAI virus A/TK/
IT/8000/02. The infective dose was 10
4 EID50. For each bird,
cloacal swabs were taken at day 3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15 and 20 post-
inoculation and tested using a real-time RT-PCR assay and virus
isolation in SPF fertile eggs. The results are given in Table 3.
Because of the higher sensitivity, we used the PCR results for our
default analysis. However, given that a positive virus isolation may
better reflect infectivity, we repeated the analysis with the virus
isolation results to assess the sensitivity of this choice for the
simulation output. Thus two different datasets were built: dataset
A (PCR assay) and dataset B (virus isolation).
Model building. We assumed that infectivity was indicated by
a positive test result and that, based on individual test results
(Table 3), the infectious period was preceded by a latent period.
This latent period began immediately after virus inoculation (day 0)
and ended at a time point (T1) between the lastnegative and the first
positive test result. Consequently, the infectious period started just
after the latent period and ended in the period (T2) between the last
positive test and the subsequent negative test. For example, bird k2
in Table 3 (dataset A) showed a latent period starting at day 0 and
lasting to somewhere between day 3 and 5 (3,T1,5); the infectious
period lasted from T1 to between day 10 and 12 (10, T2,12). We
then assumed that both the latent period (LP) and infectious period
(IP) in the population of infected birds followed a gamma
distribution, characterized by parameters k and r, as follows:
LP , gamma(kL , rL) and IP , gamma(kI , rI)
To have an estimate of the latent and infectious periods in the
population, we built a Bayesian model to link the distributions of
these periods in the population of infected birds with the test results
Figure 3. Outbreak simulation in a flock of 10,000 turkeys using the baseline model (model 2): comparison of disease dynamics
assuming different definitions of ‘‘infective birds’’ [i.e., based on PCR data or virus isolation (VI) data].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0026935.g003
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and at each sampling day (D=3, 5, 7, 10, 12, 15 and 20) the test
result y could be either positive (1) or negative (0). It follows that y
has a Bernoulli distribution, depending on the success probability p:
y , Bernoulli(p)
Assuming that the diagnostic test perfectly reflects infectivity, the
success probability (i.e., positive test result) depends on whether or
not the sample was taken during the infectious period (i.e., when the
bird sheds the virus withfaeces). We thus assumed 100%probability
of a positive test result (p=1) if the sampling day D was within the
infectious period and 0% probability of a positive test result (p=0)if
the sample was collected before or after the infectious period:
p=1 if T1#D#T2 and p=0ifD , T1 or D . T2
Due to the limited amount of data, it was impossible to obtain
reliable estimates of LP and IP for H5N2 and H7N7 strains
separately. However, preliminary investigations showed that the
overall generation time was a good average of the two separately,
which were not that far apart indeed. We thus decided to estimate
LP and IP using all the available data, given that the further
infection model will encompass enough variability to allow for
different virus transmission characteristics.
The model was implemented in WinBUGS software using the
default internal Gibbs sampler [20]. Uninformative prior distri-
butions were used for the parameters kL, rL, kI and rI [i.e.,
Gamma(0.01,0.01)]. Posterior inferences were based on 30,000
iterations with a sampling lag of 10, after a burn-in of 15 000
iterations was discarded. Convergence was assessed by running
multiple chains from dispersed starting values and using the
Gelman-Rubin statistic.
Outbreak simulations
Model building. Estimates of R0, kL, rL, kI and rI were
combined to simulate and characterize the course of LPAI
outbreaks in turkey flocks. Simulations were carried out in R
statistical software [21]. Simulations started with one index case
infected at time =0 and 9,999 susceptible birds. The end of the
latent and infectious periods of the index case were sampled and
stored. At each time step of 0.02 days, the number of infected birds
I was calculated; then the number of new infections C was sampled
from a binomial distribution (n = number of susceptible birds;
p=0.02 b I/10,000; b = transmission rate = R0 lI); finally, the
latent and infectious periods of the new cases were sampled and
stored.
The simulated outbreaks were summarized by calculating six
descriptive statistics: the time of the epidemic peak Tpeak, the peak
number of infective birds Ipeak, the seroprevalence at the epidemic
peak Rpeak, the seroprevalence at the end of the outbreak Rfinal, the
time interval during which the mid-90% of the cases occur (90%
incidence interval) D90%, and the time by which a serological
sample of 10 turkeys would result in detection with 50%
probability (assuming a test sensitivity of 97.7%) Tdet50.
Sensitivity analysis. To distinguish between sources of
variation and uncertainty, three sets of 1,000 simulations each
were performed (Table 5):
N model 1: all simulations with the same R0, kL, rL, kI and rI, all
medians from the posterior distributions. Variation among
these simulations only reflects stochastic effects.
N model 2: all simulations with the same kL, rL, kI and rI, but
with different R0. The values of R0 were all sampled from the
same gamma distribution with parameters k and r at the
median value of the posterior distributions. Variation among
these simulations reflects stochastic effects plus variation in R0
among flocks.
N model 3: all simulations with different kL, rL, kI, rI, and R0.
For each simulation, a random quartet of kL, rL, kI and rI was
sampled from their multiivariate posterior distribution. A
random couple of k and r was also sampled, and R0 was
sampled from the corresponding gamma distribution. Varia-
tion among these simulations reflects stochastic effects and
variation in R0 among flocks, plus uncertainty about the
parameter values.
Model 2 was our baseline model because it reflects the course of
outbreaks and variation therein, according to our best estimate.
The estimates of kL, rL, kI and rI included in the above-
mentioned models came from dataset A (i.e., PCR results) because
we selected PCR as our default analysis, given its higher sensitivity.
To investigate the role of the virus detection assay as a further
source of uncertainty, a fourth set of 1,000 simulations was
performed applying model 2 to dataset B (i.e., virus isolation
results).
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